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John Stuart Mill and Proportional Representation. A 
misunderstanding.  
ABSTRACT 
Mill scholars usually classify as “proportional” the theory of political 
representation sustained by John Stuart Mill. However, Mill did not use the term 
“proportional” in his texts, and “proportional representation” as understood today 
has little to do with what Mill really proposed. A hypothesis is offered to explain 
the origin of the “proportionalist” interpretation that was accepted 
at the beginning of the 20st century.  It is concluded that specialists in Mill 
should not use the word “proportional” when referring to his conception of 
political representation. In addition, political scientists should not quote Mill as 
the founder of proportional representation.  
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1. Mill in his context. 
John Stuart Mill is widely considered to be the founder of proportional 
representation1. However, the relationship between Mill and proportionality is far from 
clear.  In this paper, I aim to put forward an idea similar to Colomer (2007) when he 
dealt with Mirabeu claims. Mirabeau has been considered an early supporter of 
proportionality, largely due to his statement, “the Estates-General should be to the 
nation what a chart is to its physical configuration; in all its parts and as a whole the 
copy should at all times have the same proportions as the original” (Mirabeau, 1789, pp. 
7-8). Although this passage can be interpreted as a statement in favour of the principles 
of proportional representation, Colomer raises the following two objections (Colomer, 
2007).  
First is related to the translation. Mirabeau never actually said “the Estates-
General should be to the nation (like a chart)”, the usual translation, but “the Estates-
 
 
1 Nagel (2001:12216) distinguishes between “proportional representation” as applied to specific 
electoral systems and “proportionality”, the representative ideal to which those electoral 
systems aim. Mill enthusiastically advocated an electoral system, the Hare system. Since 
then, almost every political science or political philosophy contribution on the topic of 
political representation published throughout the last century (from Humphreys, 1911:198 
to Ryan, 2014:11) considers him a supporter of the ideal of “proportionality”. Even 
Wikipedia affirms, in its entry on “proportional representation”, that “the case for 
proportional representation was made by John Stuart Mill in his 1861 essay 





General are to the nation (like a chart)”2. The second objection is hermeneutic. The 
debate about proportional electoral rules did not start until several decades later. 
Colomer’s interpretation puts Mirabeau in context. He wrote under specific 
circumstances, the election of provincial representatives to the French Estates-General 
on the eve of the Revolution of 1789, and only from that particular situation can we 
interpret these words. Thus, “we should acknowledge that no explicit reference to new 
electoral rules of proportional representation was ever made by Mirabeau” (Colomer, 
2007: 270).  
These objections can also be raised against a certain proportionalist 
interpretation of Mill.  Several quotes are frequently offered as a proof of his support to 
proportionality: 
In my conviction, Mr. Hare’s plan [is] among the very greatest 
improvements yet made in the theory and practice of government. In the first place, 
it secures a representation, in proportion to numbers, of every division of the 
electoral body. (Considerations, C.W. XIX: 424)3. 
In a really equal democracy, every or any section would be represented, 
not disproportionately, but proportionately. A majority of the electors would 
always have a majority of the representatives; but a minority of the electors would 
 
 
2 Colomer (2007:269) mentions several incorrect translation examples: Hoag and Hallett 
(1926), Ian McLean, (1991) and Colomer (2001). However, the misinterpretation is even 
older (Sterne, 1871: 50). In 1969, Pitkin was already conscious of the problem (Pitkin, 
1969: 263).  
3 All page references to the writings of Mill are to the Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, 33 
volumes, John M. Robson, General Editor, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1963-91. 




always have a minority of the representatives. Man for man they would be as fully 
represented as the majority. (Ibid: 449) 
It must be remembered that the influence of the two great parties, under the 
present mode of election, is unlimited: in Mr. Hare’s scheme it would be great, but 
confined within bounds. Neither they, nor any of the smaller knots, would be able 
to elect more members than in proportion to the relative number of their adherents 
(Ibid: 463). 
The minor groups would have precisely the amount of power which they 
ought to have. The influence they could exercise would be exactly that which their 
number of voters entitled them to; not a particle more (Ibid: 464). 
How can it be doubted, after these conclusive declarations, that Mill consistently 
supported the proportional representation ideal? The main issue here is one of 
anachronism (Skinner, 1969). From the 21st century we think of the 19th century 
British Parliament in terms of “parties,” “majority” and “proportionality”. However, 
such conceptual configurations were somewhat alien to Mill. He used the terms 
“majority” and “minority”, but he did not understand them in the same way we 
currently do. The terms are identical, the meanings differ. 
We can observe in Mill, as in Mirabeu, certain misunderstandings in the 
translation. In Considerations on Representative Government the term “proportional 
representation” appears only on one occasion (Considerations, C.W. XIX, p. 477). 
The term he actually used was “Personal representation”. In all his books, letters, public 
speeches and in his autobiography, Mill always used the term “Personal representation” 




word “proportional”— rather than “Personal”—representation. That is the way Mill is 
usually translated4.  
What was the electoral system that Hare invented? To answer this question, it is 
necessary to examine the electoral rules that were in force in 1860, that is, the electoral 
system against which both Mill and Hare offered their alternative. At that time, the 658 
Parliament members were elected by plurality rule in uninominal districts. There were 
also a few binominal and trinominal districts, in which the two or three candidates with 
the most votes were elected. This electoral system, which Colomer calls the Originating 
system (2007: 265), was the object of numerous criticisms. Mill insisted on the 
following three:  
(1) It does not represent the defeated minorities within each district. As a result, not 
all electors are represented. 
(2) The victorious majorities are not correctly represented either, being only allowed 
to select between candidates imposed by party machinery. 
(3) It does not satisfy the majority principle. Since the 658 Parliament members 
only represent the voters from the 658 majorities (and not all the electors), each 
 
 
4 This happens even with the presentation of his work. For instance, the conference originally 
titled “The Redistribution of Seats/Conference at the Reform League Rooms” is titled in 
Mill’s Collected Works as “Proportional Representation and Redistribution” (C.W. 
XXVII: 239). However, the expression “Proportional Representation” does not appear in 
the text. It is in the mind of the editors, but not in Mill’s work and, as I intend to show, 




decision they take in the chamber will only represent the majority of those local 
majorities, not the majority of the country. 
Hare is usually regarded as the inventor of the Single Transferable Vote (STV), 
the electoral system in force today in Ireland and Malta, widely considered the 
“theoretically optimal form of PR in the opinion of the academics” (Lijphart and 
Grofman, 1984, p. 175). However, when Mill defended the Hare System, he was not 
thinking exactly of STV. Hare’s original proposal was for the 658 members of 
parliament to be elected in a “national” district, much like the current electoral system 
in the Netherlands. Of course, here is a crucial difference. In the Netherlands, electors 
vote for parties, and every party receives a proportion of seats in proportion to its votes. 
Hare, however, loathed parties. His proposal was designed to allow citizens to vote for 
candidates as individuals, hence the term “Personal Representation”. 
Under his plan, electors had to vote for their preferred candidates, ranking them 
on the ballot paper. Each elector could rank up to 658 names. First, the necessary quota 
to obtain a seat was determined (the later famous Hare quota, representing the 658th part 
of the votes). Secondly, thanks to a transfer mechanism for the surplus votes, the 658 
 
 
5 This opinion has changed today. According to a 2005 survey conducted among 170 electoral 
systems scholars, STV was the second most preferred option out of nine main categories of electoral 




winning candidates were designated6. In this paper we will assume that the quota is 
equal to 3,000 votes, in the same way that Mill did (Speech, C.W. XXVIII: 179).  
The elector could vote not only for district candidates, but for candidates from 
all over the country. In this way, each representative would represent his “voluntary 
constituency”, that is to say, his 3,000 voters. Instead of dividing the country into 658 
geographical districts, the Hare system was thought to divide it into 658 “voluntary 
constituencies,” each formed by 3,000 voters represented by their Personal 
Representative. This is the system Mill promoted, and is the system we must bear in 
 
 
6 According to Hare’s system, voters indicate on their ballot papers their orders of preference 
for each candidate. Any candidate who receives the quota with the first preferences is 
elected. If a candidate receives more than the established quota, his surplus is transferred 
to the candidates who come out with the second choice on the surplus ballots. This process 
continues until 658 candidates reach the quota and are elected. This peculiar transfer 
mechanism achieved more notoriety than any other aspect of the proposal. Both systems 
share such a mechanism, and this is probably the reason for the confusion arising between 
the Hare system and the later STV. The main difference between them is that the Hare 
system permitted electors to rank order for up to as many as 658 candidates, being the 
whole country a sole district. Modern STV, however, uses geographic districts, usually 
between three and seven representatives. Versions of STV are today used for national 
elections in several countries: in Ireland and Malta for lower house elections, in Northern 
Ireland for local, European and Assembly elections, in Australia and India for their upper 
houses, in Australia for some regional elections and in Scotland and New Zealand for local 
government elections (Mitchell 2014:247). 





mind when reading the Considerations and the other texts in which Mill supported 
electoral reform (Hart, 1992: 24-54).  
While our concepts of “majority” and “proportionality” are applied to parties, 
Mill envisaged a parliament of individuals. Moreover, a parliament in which every 
representative has his 3,000 voters in a voluntary constituency seems to fall outside our 
idea of “proportionality”. To avoid ambiguity, I will differentiate each perspective with 
a different title: 
 On the one hand, we have the current perspective, “proportionalism”. From this 
point of view minorities of the whole country have a variable weight and 
therefore need to be represented by a varying proportion of seats, a task only a 
party is able to carry out. 
 On the other hand, we have Mill’s perspective, which I will call “quotism”. 
Here, under the Hare system, electors could join together and obtain a 
representative. As a result, each successful group (or quota) of electors has the 
same size, and is represented by a personal representative. As long as electors 
vote only for personal candidates, parties are unnecessary.  
One will now perhaps have a different perspective when reading Mill on the 
Hare system. Let us take, for instance, this quotation:  
 “In my conviction, Mr. Hare’s plan [is] among the very greatest 
improvements yet made in the theory and practice of government. In the first place, 





We invariably read this fragment today as an explicit confirmation of Mill’s 
defense of proportionality. However, “in proportion to numbers” does not necessary 
imply “proportional representation”. If we read the complete quotation, it seems clear 
that every minority reaching the quota will get one representative (and no more): 
 “ (…) it secures a representation, in proportion to numbers, of every 
division of the electoral body: not two great parties alone, with perhaps a few large 
sectional minorities in particular places, but every minority in the whole nation, 
consisting of a sufficiently large number to be, on principles of equal justice, 
entitled to a representative. (Considerations, C.W. XIX: 424, emphasis added). 
This personal representation is undoubtedly “in proportion to numbers,” but is 
far from being equivalent to the widely held concept of proportional representation. 
When we read Mill writing in terms of “quotism,” and not through the paradigm of 
“proportionalism,” things appear considerably different. 
1.1.- Proportionalism vs. quotism 
The main difference between proportionalism and quotism can be described as 
follows: under a proportional system, electors form groups around different parties and, 
a posteriori, the parliament is constituted according to them. The parliamentary groups 
are shaped according to the decisions of the voters. If party A gets 7% of the votes, then 
its parliamentary group will have 7% of the seats. Under a quotist system, it is quite the 
opposite: the parliament is, a priori, composed of 658 seats, and each of them is going 
to represent the same number of voters: exactly 3,000. It is now the voters who must 
adapt to the parliamentary disposition of seats. They have to group themselves in order 




represent the seats, although this verbalization may seem rather strange.  
Indeed, the “transferable” votes on the ballot paper are nothing more than a 
designation of possibilities, indicated by the elector, to be represented by one or another 
candidate. If one´s first option is already elected, then his or her vote will go to the 
second option; if this option is also elected, then it will go to the third, and so on. It is 
the elector who must “move” from one to another representative, looking for a seat in 
which his vote may be accepted, and hence represented.  
Although this cannot be considered “proportional representation”, when 
contrasted with the Originating system, the advantages were nonetheless clear: 
(1) Everybody was represented. 
(2) Every voter was represented by someone he chose, and for whom he voted. 
(3) Everybody was represented “in proportion to numbers”. 
(4) The parliamentary majorities always represented an electoral majority. 
Today we mistakenly contextualize these four properties, which Mill incessantly 
brandished against the Originating system, within a proportionalist and party-oriented 
conception. However it is nonetheless true that the quotist and Personal representation 
concept satisfies all four. Our categories of “majority” and “proportionality,” which 
Hare and Mill never got to know, impede our full understanding of Mill’s thought.  
1.2.- Against proportionalism 
Of course, it can be alleged that, if people vote along party lines (if parties print 
their own ballots with their candidates in the same order, and electors use them) then the 




strength in seats proportional to its strength in votes. Certainly this contingency might 
legitimate the proportional interpretation. However, Hare and Mill expressly rejected 
such a version. In 1866, Bagehot presented this possibility as an objection. Although he 
conceded to recognize several advantages in Hare’s plan, the mere possibility of a 
proportional party representation was reason enough for him to reject it: 
The evident result of this organization would be the return of party men 
mainly (…) They would write to gentlemen in Parliament, and say, “You were 
elected upon ‘the Liberal ticket;’ if you deviate from that ticket you cannot be 
chosen again”. And there would be no appeal for a common-minded man. He is no 
more likely to make a constituency for himself than a mole is likely to make a 
planet” (Bagehot, 1873: 216, 219).  
Both Hare and Mill took it for granted that the electorate would never tolerate 
such electoral behaviour7. Hare affirms: “How alien all this management is to our 
habitual action,—how irreconcilable with our forms of political life!” (Hare, 1873: 15). 
Mill asserts that electors would never accept the “party ticket”: 
 
 
7 Both men were mistaken here. Bagehot was right to assume that ranking a huge number of 
personal candidates is beyond the cognitive capacity of electors. The Australian Senate offers an 
empirical confirmation: the electoral system may require voters to rank thirty or more individual 
candidates, but in 1984 the Group Vote Ticket (also known as' above the line voting') was included. Since 






 “…on Mr. Hare’s system, a vote given to a person of known worth has 
almost as much chance of obtaining its object as one given to a party candidate. It 
might be hoped, therefore, that every Liberal or Conservative, who was anything 
besides a Liberal or a Conservative—who had any preferences of his own in 
addition to those of his party—would scratch through the names of the more 
obscure and insignificant party candidates, and inscribe in their stead some of the 
men who are an honor to the nation” (Considerations, C.W. XIX: 464). 
That is the basic (and sufficient) reason, but there is a misunderstanding here. 
The essence of his answer is that such behaviour would never be widely accepted. Yet 
he continues by explaining that if it were the case (if parties were to print ballots and all 
the electors used them), that contingency (the pure proportionalist hypothesis) would be 
in itself better than the Originating system. The grading of systems, from worse to best, 
is this: Originating system, Proportional system, Personal system. It is here, in this 
passage, where we find the quotations in which Mill comes out himself most purely as a 
proportionalist: 
 “It must be remembered that the influence of the two great parties, under 
the present mode of election, is unlimited: in Mr. Hare’s scheme it would be great, 
but confined within bounds. Neither they, nor any of the smaller knots, would be 
able to elect more members than in proportion to the relative number of their 
adherents” (Considerations, C.W. XIX: 463). 
“The minor groups would have precisely the amount of power which they 
ought to have. The influence they could exercise would be exactly that which their 
number of voters entitled them to; not a particle more” (Considerations, C.W. XIX: 
464). 
Here proportionalism is explicit: he is talking about “parties,” “knots” and 
“groups”, not about personal representation. However this should not be taken out of 




(that is, proportionalism), although preferable to the existing system, was not what he 
advocated. His system was not thought to facilitate such a possibility. Indeed, Personal 
representation was specially thought of as a device against party representation. Mill’s 
evident aversion to parties, especially to ‘party machinery”, frequently can be seen his 
texts (Thompson, 1976). 
Mill even offers in the Considerations a reform of the Hare system in order to 
make impossible the party ticket, although only if it “should it be necessary to resort to 
it” (Considerations, C.W. XIX: 464). Such reform consists of limiting the number of 
“secondary” or “contingent” (“transferable”, we say today) votes from twenty to fifty. 
In that way each party would be unable to print ballots with 658 names, but only with 
twenty or fifty, and as a result each party could each only obtain twenty or fifty seats at 
most. The other seats in the parliament would be occupied by personal candidates. The 
decisive aspect here is the progression. Mill thinks that such a thing will never happen; 
and, just in case it occurs, he proposes a reform in order to make it impossible. Such a 
possibility—the one Mill hoped would never occur and the one he tried to avoid—is 
exactly what we call “Proportional Representation” today. 
2.- Minorities, majorities and objective counting 
This quotist perspective also implies a different comprehension of the concepts 
of “minority” and “majority” in Mill. When Mill talks about minorities, his notion of 
the term is not the one we normally have in mind. For us, “minorities” are homogeneous 
groups of voters with minor electoral support in the country as a whole. Most 
representative democracies currently include several minorities, normally from about 




 When Mill talks about “minorities”, he is speaking of the electors who, within 
each district, have been defeated. Under the Originating system, those minorities are not 
represented in the parliament. The Hare system did enable them to be represented, but 
not proportionally, at least not as we now understand the term. It was able to represent 
minorities not by giving them a number of seats proportional to their weight in the 
country as a whole (if  you get 5% of the votes, then you deserve 5% of the seats), but 
because if several local minorities joined a candidate and reached the quota, they would 
then be represented by that candidate. This is what “in proportion to numbers” means to 
Mill, although we almost invariably interpret it another way. We interpret the term 
“minorities” to mean “minorities in the whole country,” minorities with 3, 5 or 8% of 
the votes. Consequently, we read the expression “in proportion to numbers” under the 
desideratum that each minority should receive a number of seats proportional to that 
percentage: 3, 5 or 8% of the seats, respectively. Nevertheless, it is hard to believe Mill 
could have been thinking this way, since such a hypothesis requires the presence of 
political parties, and the Personal Representation system was specifically devised to 
diminish or even eradicate the burden of party machinery.  
Also central to Mill’s approval of Hare’s system is the majority principle. He 
constantly denounces what he perceives as an obvious defect of the Originating system. 
Since it does not represent all voters, laws passed in Parliament could be supported by 
less than half of the electorate. Therefore, Mill says, “unless minorities are counted the 
majority which prevails may be but a sham majority” (Speech, C.W. XXVIII: 184). This 
is going to be one of Mill’s main lines of reasoning (shared by all the critics of the 
Originating system). Let us suppose, for example, that a party receives 30% of the 




result, only 70% of the electors would be “counted”. Each majority of votes in the 
parliament would only represent then 35% of the electors, and not the majority of them. 
Today, we can only understand those lines through the proportionality paradigm 
filter. We have no other linguistic (and thus conceptual) tools. Let us imagine a 
perfectly proportional representation. Under this scheme, a majority in the Parliament is 
always a majority in the electorate. However, and this is critical, the opposite is also 
true: only if the representation is proportional is it possible to apply the majority 
principle. 
Under this configuration, parties monopolize representation. Again we find all 
elements of the proportionalist view: the parties receive the votes from the whole 
country in variable proportions. Accordingly, if a decision in the parliament has to be 
consistent with the majority principle, the only solution is to proportionally represent 
each political party.  
This way, since we understand “representation” as “party representation,” we are 
bound to interpret Mill in proportionalist tones, even when he is using a majoritarian 
argument. Let us examine the following quotations: 
In a really equal democracy, every or any section would be represented, 
not disproportionately, but proportionately. A majority of the electors would 
always have a majority of the representatives; but a minority of the electors would 
always have a minority of the representatives. Man for man they would be as fully 
represented as the majority (Considerations, C.W. XIX, p. 449). 
It is not only a minority who suffers. Democracy, thus constituted, does not 
even attain its ostensible object, that of giving the powers of government in all 
cases to the numerical majority. It does something very different: it gives them to a 
majority of the majority; who may be, and often are, but a minority of the whole 




When we read these fragments today, our perceptions are unconsciously being 
filtered through our previous notions of proportionality and majority, brought about by 
the party representation paradigm. The projection is so powerful that, to our eyes, only 
by means of the proportional ideal is it possible to “count” all the votes in the country. 
An operation as basic as mere counting, apparently objective and impartial, is conceived 
only under the (normative) paradigm of proportionality. 
Mill also used the verb “count”. One of his famous quotations states that 
“majorities are never sure of outnumbering minorities, unless every elector is counted”. 
But we should be aware that the “count” here is not of votes for parties. The complete 
quotation is this:  
“Majorities are never sure of outnumbering minorities, unless every elector 
is counted – unless every man’s vote is as effective as any other man’s in returning 
a representative. No system but that which that I am submitting to the House 
effects this, because it is the only system under which every vote tells, and every 
constituency is unanimous” (Speech, C.W. XXVIII, pp. 184-185, emphasis added). 
 This way of “counting” does not tie in correctly with the conceptual model of 
proportionalism. Every elector has to be counted, but to be represented by “a” 
representative (and only by one). Every elector has to be counted in parliament, but in 
“unanimous” constituencies. Today we lack a term, a figure, a conceptual formula 
embodying the possibility of counting every vote, outside the proportional-party frame. 
The only way we can currently conceive of to get everybody represented (everybody 
counts), equally represented (everybody counts the same), and thus to elect a 
government for the majority is by means of proportional representation…by parties. Yet 




equally, with a majority of seats always representing a majority of the electorate. The 
majority principle is thus safeguarded. 
There is, however, a crucial difference between both perspectives. In the party-
centred one, divisions are fixed after each election. A day after the election, minorities 
and (the possible) majority can be easily determined in Parliament. Mill, however, 
denounced “at least 500 times […] the greatness of the mistake of supposing that the 
country was divided into a majority and a minority, instead of into majorities and 
minorities” (The Reform Bill, C.W. XXVIII: 208). To Mill, the majority is not 
something which appears after the election day (a “liberal or conservative majority”), 
but an opinion which emerges in the chamber as each new issue requires a vote. 
Contrary to our parliamentary majorities and minorities (reflecting the different 
electoral sections as determined by electors on the election day, for the rest of 
legislature), Mill believed in deliberative majorities and minorities, which would reflect 
in the chamber the result of discussion and debate, emerging and reshaping with each 
new parliamentary decision.  
3.- Deliberation vs. proportionality 
Until now, the Hare system has been examined only from an “electoral” 
perspective. When we consider Mill's theory of Representation the proportionalist 
reading attributed to him becomes even less plausible. Usually, quotations supporting 
such reading are extracted from chapter seven of the Considerations. But all the 
proposals in the chapter have to be read in light of the former chapter in which Mill 
warns of the two major dangers of representative government, the two that Hare’s 




moderately, insufficient mental qualifications, in the controlling body; secondly, the risk 
of its being under the influence of interests not identical with the general welfare of the 
community” (Considerations, C.W. XIX: 436). 
Mill’s remedy for the first risk is a parliament with men who personify the 
country’s highest intelligence and virtue. The faith Mill holds in the process of 
deliberation leads him to consider the mere inclusion of several of such men to be of 
beneficial effect to an appropriate government of the nation. However, under the 
Originating system minorities remained without representation and majorities were 
misrepresented. He hoped that with Hare’s system, morally solid and wise candidates 
could receive votes from the entire country, not only from their districts, and as a result, 
would have a high probability of being elected. Consequently, the party machinery 
would be forced to compete with those candidates and to select prestigious men to 
represent the party. The elite would reach the Parliament: 
Hundreds of able men of independent thought, who would have no chance 
whatever of being chosen by the majority of any existing constituency, have by 
their writings, or their exertions in some field of public usefulness, made 
themselves known and approved by a few persons in almost every district of the 
kingdom; and if every vote that would be given for them in every place could be 
counted for their election, they might be able to complete the number of the quota. 
In no other way which it seems possible to suggest would Parliament be so certain 
of containing the very elite of the country. (Considerations, C.W. XIX: 456). 
The second threat was the “danger of class legislation on the part of the 
numerical majority” (Considerations, C.W. XIX: 448). Mill was perfectly conscious 
that labouring men constituted the numerical majority of the country. He was in favour 




certain “checks”. The checks were basically two: the Plural vote and, more importantly, 
the Hare system. Mill could sacrifice the first, but not the second (Letter to Max 
Kyllman, 1865, C.W. XVI: 998). 
There is, in consequence, an obvious contradiction between the attribution of a 
proportionalist ideology avant la lettre to Mill, and his aversion to the possibility of 
class legislation. If it is true that the Hare system is a proportional system, and if Mill 
knew that workers were an unequivocal majority, then Mill should have been conscious 
of the danger. That he was not demonstrates that he simply did not understand the Hare 
system in that way.  In fact, when he accepted to be a candidate for the House of 
Commons, he said that he would support a bill which “would give to the labouring 
classes a clear half of the national representation,” but not more (Letter to James Beal, 
C. W. XVI: 1032). It is hard not to see here a direct refutation of the basic proportional 
principle. 
Undoubtedly there are in Mill proportional expressions, but not a proportionalist 
philosophy. The approach and presuppositions of proportionalism are distant from his 
thought and perspective. His ideal of representative government is not the “mirror” of 
the people, but rather a vision of “guides” or, more appropriately, of a “self-guided 
people”. Through representation, they are “self-improved”. In contrast to Considerant, 
who thought that “every opinion, however absurd, even monstrous it may appear, must 
have its representatives in proportion to its strength in the electorate” (Hermens, 1941: 
3), Mill did not aspire to represent/reflect everything in parliament—true or false, noble 




4.- The weight of a paradigm 
Thomas Hare, the inventor of “the most proportional of systems” (Ryan, 2014: 
11), wrote the following in response to certain interpretations of his proposal: 
“Every detail of this scheme converges to one central point,—that of 
making the exercise of the suffrage a step in the elevation of the individual 
character, whether it be found in a majority or a minority. I disclaim for it, 
therefore, the title of a representation of minorities” (Hare, 1873: XIX, emphasis 
added). 
Paradoxically, the interpretation that has prevailed throughout has been the one 
that the author himself intended to avoid. The proportionalist reading has become 
authoritative. Mill is today the philosopher of proportionality, and the Hare system is 
currently considered as one of the best proportional systems. How has such an 
interpretation come about? I can only briefly put forward my hypothesis, leaving its 
complete development for another occasion. This hypothesis rests on two pivotal 
events. 
The first is the historical formation of the Majority vs. Proportionality 
dichotomy, the frame which today dominates our conceptual approach to all electoral 
and representative issues. This dichotomy was forged around 1900, crystallized in 1941 
with Hermens, and became canonical thanks to Duverger and his sociological laws. 
Once established, it provides the basic conceptual and terminological tools with which 
we look back. 
Here I am only concerned with the historical genesis of one of the dichotomy’s 
horns, the proportional one. In Mill’s times, there were four alternatives to the 




the Cumulative vote, the Limited vote, the Hare system and the Proportional Party List 
system (Bromund, 2001). This demand for the “representation of minorities” will 
become, over the period running from 1870 until approximately the end of the century, 
the claim for “proportional representation”. Around 1900, the term “proportionality” 
refers indistinctly to the four electoral systems (Humphreys, 1911). The four conform 
the “proportional systems”, not the “representation of minorities” systems8.  
Compared to the Originating system, the four systems represent minorities in 
some manner. However only one (the Party List Proportional, defended by Considerant 
and Naville in Switzerland) is in fact “proportional” from an electoral perspective. 
Cumulative Vote and Limited Vote are majoritarian. The Hare system is, as we can say 
now, quotist. Mill’s prestige and reputation were brandished in defense of all the 
alternatives to the Originating system. Such alternatives are going to configure one of 
 
 
8 Mill is probably the best exponent of this process, since he successively defended two of the 
four systems: the Cumulative Vote, in his Thoughts about Parliamentary Reform, and the 
Hare system, in his Considerations (Hart, 1992; Parsons, 2009). Indeed, at the end of 
chapter 7 of Considerations, he included under the “Personal representation” label all the 
contemporaneous alternatives to the Originating system. The problem is that those 
proposals are very different from each other. Mill cited the existing systems in Switzerland 
(Party List), in the USA (Cumulative List) and in Australia (the Hare System). Mill 
stressed that “the scheme is rapidly making its way”. Too much rapidly, indeed. Early on, 
the expression “proportional” prevailed over the term “personal”. In 1878, for example, 
the Spanish edition of the Considerations already translated “personal representation” into 
“proportional representation” (Mill, 1878). The same happened in several languages. See, 





the horns of the dichotomy, that of the proportionality, and in consequence the authority 
of Mill is going to glide from his particular electoral system, the Hare system, to one of 
the two abstract principles of political representation, proportionality. 
This is the first event of the hypothesis. The second arises when Mill is read in 
the light of this dichotomy. After Duverger, the Majority vs. Proportionality paradigm is 
omnipresent, and Mill tends to be read as the founder of the proportional archetype. In 
1969, Pitkin (Pitkin, 1969, p. 21) compares the two representation models respectively 
headed by Burke and Mill. Her comparative assessment can be summarized as follows: 
BURKE 
METAPOLITICS REPRESENTATIVE´S ROLE 
Representatives as superior in 
wisdom 
Political issues as having objective 
solutions: deliberation 
National interest 
Independence. Representative as a 
trustee. 
MILL 
METAPOLITICS REPRESENTATIVE´S ROLE 
Equality of capacity  
Political issues as involving 
irrational commitment: “Choice rather 
than deliberation” 
Personal or local interests  
Dependence. Representative as an 
agent. 
 
Although Pitkin herself indicates that identification of Mill with all the 
assertions in the table is not “complete,” the problem is actually much deeper than this. 
Pitkin assumes that judgments relative to the role of representatives derive from the 
particular metapolitics sustained by each author.  However the part of the table 
consigned to Mill seems to have been mediated by the electoral paradigm of 




about “proportionality”. The origin of those statements seems not to be Mill’s texts, but 
the theoretical and abstract definition of “proportionality” as it appears in Political 
Science texts. Mill did not endorse the dependence of the representative: “the delegation 
theory of representation seems to me false, and its practical operation hurtful” 
(Considerations, C.W. XIX, p. 511). The other elements identified by Pitkin are equally 
debatable9. 
Firstly, it is clear that the Hare system rendered obsolete the very concept of the 
geographical district, or, “locality” as a political component. Secondly, Mill did not 
believe in the equality of capacity between representatives and the represented. The 
equal vote is “in principle wrong by recognizing a wrong standard and exercising a bad 
influence on the voter’s mind. It is not useful, but hurtful, that the constitution of the 
country should declare ignorance to be entitled to as much political power as 
knowledge” (Considerations, C.W. XIX, p. 477). This justification of an unequal vote is 
a consequence of the rather objectivist view that Mill held toward politics. As his friend 
Hare succinctly expressed, “after all, the end is good government” (Hare, 1873, p. xx).  
Thirdly, there does not exist in Mill´s thinking and writings the notion that 
political representation is merely a question of “choice rather than deliberation.” In his 
view, “the voter is under an absolute moral obligation to consider the interest of the 
public, not his private advantage,” (Considerations, C.W. XIX, p. 490). Indeed, Mill 
 
 
9 Thompson, (1976: 116) assigns Mill an intermediate position in the mandate-independence 
controversy. That is undoubtedly right, but here I do not want to situate Mill on that scale, 




defended the Hare system not because of its “proportionality,” but because of the 
absolute faith he had in the power of deliberation. He firmly believed that if honest and 
intelligent men reached parliament and could be heard, then reason and good sense 
would prevail. Mill wants all minorities to reach the parliament and be heard, not to 
give them more or less weight in proportion to their numbers of voters. His conception 
of political representation was based in deliberation, not in proportionality.  
5.- Proportionality without parties? 
Two consequences are worth highlighting. The first is related to Mill’s 
philosophy. Mill scholars know perfectly that he was against parties and against the 
“representative as an agent” model. Yet they continue using the adjective “proportional” 
ascribed to his works. I think Political Science, and specifically the “Proportionality vs. 
Majority” paradigm, has played a role here.  Mill scholars are not going to get confused, 
but people who have not studied Mill in as much depth are not as fortunate, because the 
term “proportional” has today its own underlying meaning. What Mill always defended 




10 Specialists in Mill are aware that there is a difficulty here. Urbinati, for example, suggests that 
Mill intended an “elitist use of proportionality” (2000: 760). In my opinion, what is 
problematic is the customary use of the term “proportionality” still applied to Mill and 
Hare (Ryan, 2007: 165; Thompson, 2007: 175; Riley, 2007: 226; Kumar, 2013: 138; Ryan, 
2014: 11). Maybe the use of the term “quotism” would result in a more accurate 




The second consequence has to do with the current classification of electoral 
systems. Political Science usually considers STV proportional to candidates, not to 
party lists. According to this, there is such a thing as a “proportional representation” not 
related to parties (or to racial or to ethnic groups, or to issues) but to persons. That is to 
say, a representation that is proportional and, at the same time, personal. As I 
understand it, that is not logically possible (not at long as one person can obtain only 
one seat). In all probability that is the reason why STV has always maintained a singular 
position and status in electoral classifications11. Unfortunately, this question cannot be 





11 In 1910, the “Royal commission appointed to enquire into electoral systems” 
declared that STV “was not originally invented as a system of proportional representation” 
(1910: 35); in 1984, Dummett affirmed – correctly, in my understanding - that “STV is 
obviously a majority procedure” (1984: 280); in 2014, Farrell and Katz wrote that “in a 
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